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MR. SCRUGGS: Well, welcome back to Rubloff 150, everybody. We are in here
for the rest of the day. This panel is going to go until about 3:30. Then we are going to
have kind of a cookie and coffee break. At 4:00 our last panel is going to kick off, and
then at 5:30 we are going to have a little cocktail reception.
All of it, the rest of it, is in Rubloff 150. Hunker down, get comfortable. We will
be here the rest of the day pretty much.
Quick housekeeping items. For any of the attorneys that are here for CLE credits,
make sure you get these forms. They are out on the registration table in the atrium. If
you don't want to go there, let me know and I can go get them for you real quick. Make
sure you get them, and if you can fill them out and get payment to me before you go
today. And if for some reason you were like, Oh, my gosh, I wanted to bring a check,
forgot my checkbook, let me know that, too, and I can give you my business card and we
can have you mail it in with the check and handle it that way.
Housekeeping items done, our next panel is a fun one. It is entitled, The Pendulum
Swings Back: The Impact of Recent Supreme Court of the United States and Federal
Circuit Cases specifically on patent law, but any other areas that it impacts, as well.
We have a very distinguished panel with us today. I would like to introduce them
very briefly.
On my left and your far right is Troy Groetken. He is a partner over at McAndrews
Held & Malloy here in Chicago. I'm not going to go into detailed into his biography, but
let me assure you, if you go to his web page, you will find that he is every bit as esteemed
and impressive member of this panel as anyone else.
Next we have Professor Sean Seymore, who is a visiting professor here with us at
Northwestern University School of Law this year, but I believe next year he is going to
William & Mary.
PROFESSOR SEYMORE: Washington & Lee.
MR. SCRUGGS: Washington & Lee. Sorry about that. So we will certainly miss
him, but we appreciate his contributions here.
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And at Washington & Lee he is going to be teaching courses in patent law and
science and torts. He is obviously finishing his stint at Northwestern as a visiting
assistant professor. His research focuses on the intersection of the patent laws with the
norms of scientific research.
Now, before entering law teaching, Professor Seymore was an associate in the
patent practice group at Foley Hoag in Boston, and before attending law school, he was
actually a chemistry professor. He holds a B.S. in chemistry from the University of
Tennessee, an M.S. in chemistry from Georgia Tech, and a Ph.D. in chemistry from the
University of Notre Dame and a J.D. from the University of Notre Dame.
Next on the panel, we have Professor Tim Holbrook. He is a tenured associate
professor of law and the associate director of the program in intellectual property law at
the Chicago-Kent College of Law. He graduated summa cum laude from North Carolina
State University with a B.S. in chemical engineering, where he was the valedictorian.
Professor Holbrook earned his J.D. from Yale Law School and then clerked for
then Chief Judge Glenn L. Archer, Jr., of the Federal Circuit. He practiced in Budapest,
Hungary, and Washington, D.C., before joining Chicago-Kent. His scholarship has
appeared in a variety of legal and scientific journals, and he is the co-author of Patent
Litigation and Strategy with Judge Kimberly A. Moore and Chief Judge Paul R. Michel
of the Federal Circuit. Professor Holbrook was the Edwin A. Heafey Jr. Visiting
Professor of Law at Stanford Law School in the fall of 2007.
And on your far left, my far right, we have Don Zuhn, who is a partner -- actually a
named party at MBHB, McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff, where his practice
focuses on biotech and pharmaceutical patent prosecution litigation.
He actually received his Ph.D. in mammalian genetics from the University of
Illinois at Chicago, and graduated summa cum laude from the John Marshall Law School.
Dr. Zuhn is also the founder and editor of the Patent Docs weblog, a site that focuses on
developments in biotech and pharma patent law.
And so without further ado, I'm going to hand it off to our esteemed panelists.
DR. ZUHN: When you look at the topic, you will see that it's kind of broad, so a
lot of cases have come down in the last three years in the Supreme Court alone that have
had an enormous impact on patent practice: MedImmune, EBay, Merck, and about a year
ago, KSR. So we were asked to do about 10 or 15 minutes on this broad subject but pick
something that we wanted to talk about.
So I'm going to focus on KSR, since we are about two weeks away from the oneyear anniversary.
Also, as Brandon mentioned, my practice is biotech and
pharmaceutical, so a little selfishly, I'm going to focus on the impact of KSR on my
practice. Although, I think that some of the things that I will mention in my brief
discussion would be applicable to, you know, other subject matter, as well.
And so about a month and a half ago, I was at a conference in New York, and the
group director for The Technology Center 1600, Bruce Kisliuk gave a presentation. He
had been invited to come in and talk about GSK, but at that time we did not have -surprisingly did not have a decision in that case, so he had to fill his hour and a half with
some other stuff.
He had a lot of interesting things to say, and the majority of his talk was about how
examiners in his group were being taught to examine applications for obviousness,
compliance with Section 103, and he mentioned that in October we had -- the Patent
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Office had come out with guidelines for examiners to use in examining applications, and,
of course, we had the KSR decision.
And it was his opinion that KSR didn't -- or the guidelines, neither represented a
sea change in the way examiners are looking or supposed to be looking at applications.
And, you know, it was his opinion that examiners were already using Graham, should be
using Graham and that TSM, teaching, suggestion or motivation tests, should not be the
focus of the analysis.
And so -- just as a reminder for the audience, the Graham factors, you have scope
and content of the prior art, differences between the claimed invention and the prior art,
level of ordinary skill in the art, and then the secondary considerations like commercial
success, unexpected results, failure of others.
And so he has these guidelines and he has KSR, and instead of using that -- at the
time they had just finished training all of the examiners in The Technology Center 1600,
which by the way covers biotechnology and organic chemistry, and that is the focus of
that particular group.
So instead of using the guidelines which he felt were more applicable to
mechanical-type inventions and maybe not so applicable to the applications that his group
is seeing, he decided to put together -- or the directors in the group decided to put
together 11 cases, and they would teach the examiners how to examine for obviousness,
based on these 11 cases, eight of which are Federal Circuit cases -- or seven of which are
Federal Circuit cases, and there is one board decision and the rest are district court cases.
Just as a plug, if you go to Patent Docs, you will see that we have covered all of these
Federal Circuit cases, and if you do a search for Kisliuk, you will also see a list of the 11
cases and a little bit more detailed description.
We have summarized these cases, and I was just going to briefly touch on a few of
them, the ones that I feel are maybe more interesting. So of the Federal Circuit cases, the
seven, there is one that is pre-KSR, and all of the rest came out after KSR. And the one
that is pre-KSR, to me, is maybe the most interesting, and I think it might be discussed a
little bit more. This one came out about a month before the KSR decision came out. The
case is Pfizer v. Apotex. Pfizer's patent is directed to a compound called amlodipine
besylate, and this is the active ingredient in a drug Norvasc, which is for treating
hypertension. And what Pfizer did is, they had a related compound, which was a maleate
salt. Besylate is the salt version of this, and this is what you do to drugs to get them
ready to make them more bioavailable to use them as therapeutics.
So Pfizer had a patent to a maleate form, and when they were making tablets, it was
mucking up the tablet device and it was a very sticky composition and, also, it was not
very stable. So they were looking for something that was better, something that was
different, and what they had to pick from were 53 known anions that you could use to
mix with the drug to get the salt form of this particular therapeutic.
And they even knew a little bit more of the prior art pointed towards certain anions,
so the list was narrowed down to seven or nine different anions. What the district court
had said was that Pfizer's compound was nonobvious, and the Federal Circuit reversed
and said it was. And I think that this case is interesting because even though it is preKSR, it has a little bit of this, you know, known problem for which there is an obvious
solution, and that is using these other anions to find something that is more stable and
maybe less sticky.
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There was also some obvious-to-try arguments that Pfizer used, but here again we
have something that is related to KSR. In KSR you have this phrase of finite number of
identified predictable solutions, so here we have that same kind of situation. We have at
the most 53 anions, one of which they have already used for the maleate form, and at the
least we have narrowed this down to seven or nine.
So I think that case, even though it is before KSR, it has some interesting KSR-like
discussion in it.
And another case, Takeda Chemical Industries v. Alphapharm, this is kind of
contrasted with Pfizer. In this case Takeda had a compound for treating Type 2 Diabetes,
and the district court said that the compound was nonobvious and the Federal Circuit
affirmed. And the difference between this case and Pfizer is here there were millions -hundreds of millions of compounds in the prior art that you could pick from to find the
compound that you would change to make into this patented therapeutic for treating Type
2 diabetes. So you can contrast that with Pfizer. Here we have not a finite number of
predictable solutions.
One of the other cases, Pharmstem Therapeutics versus Viacell. In this case, you
have a process for harvesting umbilical -- stem cells from umbilical cord blood and
freezing them and then using them later to introduce them into the same person or
someone who is a type match in order to reconstitute their blood and immune system.
And in this case, the prior art taught both, you know, freezing cord blood as well as
-- there was a reference where cord blood was used to reconstitute. Although, the success
was only like five weeks but to reconstitute a patient's immune system.
So this is akin in KSR to dissection -- in KSR the Supreme Court talks about these
three cases, about combining prior known elements so it is old elements, you know, new
combination. And this is akin to the one case that they talked about, which was the
radiant heat burner and paving machine combination.
So here in this case, the process is obvious because these two major prongs are
already in the prior art. You don't see a lot -- at least I don't see a lot of cases that address
level of ordinary skill in the art. Remember, that is one of the Graham factors that I
mentioned.
And one case that did, that came out July is Daiichi Sankyo versus Apotex. So this
case deals with -- Daiichi had a method of treating ear infections using an antibiotic, and
the district court had determined that the level of ordinary skill in the art was a
pediatrician or a general practitioner. And Apotex disagreed and the Federal Circuit
agreed with them, that the level of skill in the art was a drug researcher, somebody who is
actually making ear therapeutics. And this is important because the district court had
reached its decision that it was nonobvious, which the Federal Circuit reversed, because
there was a piece of prior art that the district court said that the general
practitioner/pediatrician would not be aware of. So by setting the bar low, you rope in a
lot more people of ordinary skill in the art, and they would not be aware of this particular
reference. As specious as the district court's argument was, that was how they actually
reached that decision, and that is how the Federal Circuit reversed.
Another interesting case came out in August, In re Sullivan. This case involves an
antibody fragment that you use to treat rattlesnake bites. It is an antivenom composition,
and so the prior art teaches whole antibodies as an antivenom. It teaches the use of
antibody fragments to detect but not treat, to detect snake toxin, and it also teaches that
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antibody fragments are cleared from the body faster. This is important because venom
hangs around the body for an extended period of time.
So in this case, the Federal Circuit -- this came from the board obviously, but the
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded and said that the board needed to consider
Sullivan's declarations -- he submitted, I think, three -- that suggested this was
nonobvious because you would not use fragments to be cleared from the body fast to treat
something that is going to stick around a long time. Also, Sullivan showed that there was
some unexpected properties for the antibody fragments, and that is another important,
you know, secondary consideration.
Then the last two cases that I wanted to talk about, you can compare them with
each other also, and they are a little complex. I'm not going to go into too much detail
about them. The first one is Forest Laboratories v. Ivas Pharmaceuticals, and the second
is Aventis Pharma v. Lupin.
In Forest Laboratories, you have -- Forest Lab had a drug, Lexapro, it's an
antidepressant, and the active ingredient in this drug is a plus enantiomer, and four groups
in -- of researchers at the same time as Forest Labs had tried to separate -- and
enantiomers are related compounds, but a plus enantiomer versus a minus enantiomer
could have different properties. One could be more effective than the other.
In this case, that was the case. The plus enantiomer was much more potent than its
related compound. The problem was that four groups in the prior art weren't able to
actually separate this mixture, and the inventors were the first ones to be able to do that.
Also, the prior art had a teaching that the other enantiomer, the wrong one, should be the
more potent one, so the prediction was incorrect, so you have a teaching away.
In that case, the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding that the compound was -- Forest
Labs' compound was not obvious. And, like I said, you could contrast that with Aventis,
which involved ramipril, which is a blood pressure medicine. In this case, the district
court had made one error, and that -- made a couple, but one of the errors that they made
was that they had applied -- and this case is from September.
So they had applied TSM, teaching suggestion, or motivation, rigid application of
that. They had required that you actually find a suggestion or motivation to use this
particular compound to do this, and the difference between this case and Forest is that
there were two stereoisomers, one was effective and one wasn't, but you could separate
them. That was something that was easy to do, so in this case, the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's finding that the compound was obvious. I hope I did not go
over.
MR. SCRUGGS: No, you are fine.
DR. ZUHN: Any questions? Or I'll just pass it on.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: Okay. I'm going to take a step back and do a little bit
of why is all of this happening? Why on earth has the Supreme Court jumped back in,
although they seem to have a little bit of patent indigestion right now? They only have
one case currently pending on patent exhaustion, the first-sale doctrine.
But why on earth, if you have a Federal Circuit that takes all of the patent appeals
from across the country, why would the Supreme Court step back in? To use a metaphor
that has been grossly abused since George Clooney's movie, it's the perfect storm. Right?
That what we have is, we have the FTC and the NRC giving these reports about
something is wrong with the patent system.
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What happens after these reports, you get Congress getting interest in making
reform. You see the PTO start to issue new guidelines about obviousness, about subject
matter, and, of course, you are going to see a reaction in the courts with perhaps one
exception, the Federal Circuit. Right?
The Federal Circuit up until this point, I think, had been fairly insular. They think
of themselves as "the patent court." We know what we are doing. No one else can tell us
how to do our job. In fact, if you look at how much they cite any sort of literature,
outside of their own opinions, it's almost nothing. Right? They look to their own law
and no one else. You can't get much more insular than that, right?
You say, Well, what is wrong? Maybe we are going down the wrong path, there
was no method to correct that path. So I think that is part of it, patent reform was just
sort of in the air. And I also think the Supreme Court was interested in the institutional
dynamic between it and the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit was created in 1982,
right? It's a new court. It's fairly young. I think the Supreme Court was really letting the
Federal Circuit get its wings. If you step in too much, too early in a young court, it loses
its credibility, and this court really needed to assert itself.
And I think early on the Federal Circuit did a good job of sort of getting the law
fairly harmonized compared to the patchwork in patent law that we had with the Regional
Circuit deciding these issues. But after 20 years, a court grows up, and I think the
Supreme Court was thinking maybe we should take a step back and see what is going on
here, particularly when you see some of the decisions that were coming out of the Federal
Circuit. The earlier cases the Supreme Court would take had a number of constitutional
issues.
Markman was a right to a jury trial. Warner-Jenkinson was actually framed as
whether or not there was a right to a jury trial. They ended up going towards prosecution
history, estoppel instead, but then you started getting some odd cases. Like why on earth
did they take that? Why does the Supreme Court care about the on-sale bar? But then I
think what triggered their interest is Festo, where the Federal Circuit, in light of the
Supreme Court decision, articulates this bright line rule out of left field, unprecedented,
and I think the Supreme Court thought, something is going wrong at the court below us.
They seem to think that they are the Supreme Court, and, remember, they are not. There
is the U.S. Supreme Court. The Federal Circuit is not the Supreme Court of patent law.
So I do think they were concerned about this idea that the Federal Circuit had about
certainty. The Federal Circuit loves these bright line rules. I have heard one of the
judges express in public that their job is to put themselves out of a job, where they can
make the law so certain, we would not have any litigation any more. And I don't think
the Supreme Court shares that view. I think they believe certainty is important to a
certain level, but not if you are going to operate at the expense of fairness in certain
contexts.
So you see them taking what the Federal Circuit does and instead of using these
harsh rules, they use these rebuttable presumptions. You see that with Festo, you see it
with Warner-Jenkinson. I wish we would have seen it with KSR. Instead, they gave us, I
think, some mush. You could see how they could have put presumptions in there. So I
think there was an institutional dynamic at play as well. Right? We are the Supreme
Court, not you. We are going to basically create what we think is, of course, correction
and now I think what we are seeing is, we are going to step back a little bit and see what
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happens. Right? Will this inferior court listen to us or not? So I think that is the
question for the coming years.
Aside from congressional reform, I think it is going to see whether the Federal
Circuit listens, and I think it is mixed signals so far of whether they are going to.
With respect to KSR, in particular, the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit and Judge
Rader have both said in public, KSR didn't change anything. That was our law
beforehand. They changed nothing, so there it does not seem to be getting back to them.
Whereas, the PTO thinks the world has turned upside down. They think this
important Federal Circuit case has been overturned by KSR, so there is completely a
disconnect between what the PTO thinks the impact of KSR was and what the Federal
Circuit thinks the impact of KSR is. The academics, if the Federal Circuit would ever
listen or at least read one of our articles, when we think that we are writing to an
audience, they think something happened. There was something taking place in KSR.
You see them bringing back these cases post-Graham and giving teeth to this idea of
obvious to try, which the Federal Circuit had expressly rejected.
The Federal Circuit has overruled Supreme Court precedent and just did not bother
to tell them they were doing that. So I think in KSR more went on.
The other institutional dynamic about KSR that I think is interesting is, I have
never seen a lower court lobby so hard in its opinions not to be reversed. If you read the
opinion coming out of the Federal Circuit between the grant of cert in KSR and the actual
decision, there is all this litany of language about, “We don't apply this rigidly, it is not a
strict test.” You even saw that dynamic at the oral argument in KSR. You want an
interchange in colloquy, listen to this oral argument.
You have got Justice Scalia saying, “Isn't this just mush? And, what, now after 20
years when we finally grant cert, they try to make this clear what they actually mean?”
Right? You saw that the Supreme Court heard it. They were not pleased with what the
Federal Circuit was doing. In that way, I was a little bit disappointed that KSR did not
speak up a little bit more strongly at that institutional level.
If you do have some passing time, it's an interesting argument to read because you
see the odd dynamic of this specialized court guarding its turf a little bit, and you even
see that now with the legislative defense coming before Congress. Other than the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, I don't know that I have ever seen a federal judge write
letters to congressmen suggesting that they like or dislike certain legislation.
You typically think courts are about, “Well, we will apply the law as Congress
gives it to us,” and the Chief Judge has actually sent letters to The Hill saying, “We don't
like these provisions,” which is a little bit different. Supreme Court, yeah, you get that on
occasion, coming from the Judicial Conference, but the Federal Circuit is in a unique
position.
I think some of the other interesting cases to watch to see if they get the message
will be the Microsoft case. Now, Microsoft itself dealing with exportation of software is
a fairly narrow issue, but when you read the Supreme Court's opinion, there is this ending
paragraph about U.S. patent laws do not apply extraterritorially, and we create this
presumption and reiterated the presumption that they had spoken in a case in 1972 Deep
South.
Why I bring that up is increasingly there are these extraterritorial concerns in patent
law. Most of you have probably heard of the Blackberry case, a little $600 million
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settlement. Unfortunately, I went into academia because that was my old law firm that
got the settlement. I could have retired.
But part of the system there was in Canada, so we say there is infringement under a
U.S. patent even though part of the system was in Canada. I think it will be interesting to
see how that language in Microsoft will play out in some of these increasingly
extraterritorial cases.
I mean, MedImmune dealing with the declaratory judgment jurisdiction is going to
be tough for the courts. I think it is going to be harder for companies. They basically
said, “If you have a disagreement over the license, you don't have to breach the license to
get jurisdiction.” Then you have the Federal Circuit saying, “Well, any license
negotiation necessarily seems to suggest a conflict that gets you into court.”
So what happens -- and any of you who did the Giles Richtown petition this year
knows, they had a great problem. You have this license, it's about to end. The patent
term is longer than the license. Let's say there is three years left on the term after the
license ends. Can that license be just walk into court and challenge the validity of the
patent? If I'm a patent holder, that is a little uncomfortable. Right? That my license now
does not mean anything.
So I do think that the KSR side is suggesting, “All right, they are not getting the
message.” The Federal Circuit isn't getting the message, but there are some signals that
they are getting the message. I think that In re Seagate, maybe the message was not
coming from the Supreme Court, but it was coming -- that reform is coming, and we want
to act first before Congress screws things up.
In re Seagate made it harder to prove willfulness, to get treble damages in patent
cases, and it is an odd procedural case because they actually establish the standard for
willfulness in a discovery dispute. So there is an argument whether that is even
appropriate, so they do decide, they heighten the standards over this attorney-client
privilege waiver.
But where you do, I think, see the Federal Circuit getting it is In re Bilski, which is
the current en banc case to consider subject matter eligibility. Before you had State
Street, anything under the sun that is made by man is patent eligible, business methods
are great, tax methods are great, there is even applications to claim story themes as
opposed to the actual copyright itself with the idea of, Oh, here is someone who
witnesses a crime and must go into hiding to escape the mob. I just described every John
Grisham novel, right?
They patent that. And so there have been applications in that regard, so many
people who were frightened that subject matter eligibility was going awry, the Supreme
Court was set to decide that. In the Metabolite case, they actually went out of their way
to grant cert because the issue clearly was not before the lower court. The Supreme
Court reaches, takes the case, grants cert, hears argument, and then dismisses its cert
improvidently granted. So it was a little bit strange.
There was some changes of the court, but there was a descent from the dismissal
that really suggested State Street is wrong. It is inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent, so I think that Bilski is the Federal Circuit, at least being beaten down enough
to finally say, “Okay, we need to revisit subject matter eligibility.” They did conclude
earlier in the year that a patent claiming a signal or the signal itself is not eligible subject
matter.
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And, surprisingly, they let that one go. Even though Bilski is now en banc and it is
dealing with a method of arbitration, they let -- no one knows how to pronounce it. That
is why they did not take it en banc, Knighton. They let that one go. There is another one,
In re Comisky, which is floating out there, and it seems that they are holding on to
Comiskey until they decide Bilski, right?
But they clearly seem to be getting the message from the Supreme Court that we
need to respond, we need to alter our standards for subject matter credibility. I think that
is going to be argument May 7th?
MR. GROETKEN: Yeah.
MR. HOLBROOK: It is coming up in May. So at the end of the day, what is the
current status? I think the Supreme Court is done for a little bit. I really don't think that
we are going to see a lot of activity by the Supreme Court in patent law. I think they are
going to wait and see what did the Federal Circuit do.
The Federal Circuit, I think, at this point is a little more concerned with what is
Congress going to do. One, if the PTO gets substantive rule making authority, I think the
Federal Circuit will openly weep because they really don't like that idea.
MR. KUHN: So will practitioners.
MR. HOLBROOK: So will practitioners. And I think the thought of interlocutory
appeals -- automatic interlocutory appeals on claim construction really has the Federal
Circuit crying.
DR. ZUHN: That was the Chief Judge's biggest criticism.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: Absolutely. And we will see what happens in that
regard.
I think the other thing to watch is one where the Supreme Court might step in and
one where the Federal Circuit might act on their own is de novo review claim
construction. I really think that de novo review is on the way out the door. Whether it
comes from the Supreme Court, whether it comes internally from the Federal Circuit, I'm
not certain, but it is a question of who acts first because if you do the head counting, there
are at least eight judges on the Federal Circuit out of 12 who are willing to reconsider de
novo review. That is enough to get en banc consideration. It is just going to be which
case provides the appropriate view. I will end with that.
PROFESSOR SEYMORE: All right. Well, to follow along with the current
theme, I'm going to actually touch on the Federal Circuit's response to recent Supreme
Court activity. So, specifically, I'm going to talk about the Federal Circuit's new
enablement standard and explore its potential impact on patentees.
So, as most of you know, KSR was a very popular case. It seems like, at least in
the headlines, whenever you hear about patent law, there are always these certain buzz
words that always catch the public's attention. Obviousness, that is something that the
public and ordinary people can grab onto. To me it seems that enablement is one of the
issues that receives less attention, at least in the media and possibly among patent
practitioners and academics.
For those of you that had me in class, you know that enablement is one of my
favorite topics. And, in short, the requirement ensures that the patent discloses the
claimed invention in sufficient detail so that a skilled artisan can make and use the
invention without undue experimentation.
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So I will give you a little road map of what I want to talk about today. The first
thing I want to do is to set the stage and briefly explore the contours of enablement and
the two lines of jurisprudence that have emerged within the Federal Circuit.
Then I will briefly explore the, I guess, impact of KSR on enablement, and within
that, I'll touch on two specific cases. And then, finally, I will discuss the implications for
patentees.
So the enablement requirement, one thing that it does do is, it places an outer limit
on the scope of the claims. It is well settled in patent law that an applicant need not
physically reduce an invention to practice before obtaining the patent.
So, for example, as a scientist working examples are ideal but they are not required.
So sometimes you end up with these -- with a situation where an applicant will actually
prophetically claim an invention or maybe only describe one or two embodiments in
detail but they actually claim a very broad genus.
So the question is how has the court dealt with that in the past and how is the court
dealing with that currently. Over the years, there are -- two strands of enablement
jurisprudence have developed. One strand dealt with chemical types of inventions, and
those inventions are known as the unpredictable arts. And they are called unpredictable
because a skilled artisan in a field like chemistry, for example, can't really take the results
from one experiment and actually extrapolate that across an entire genus with any
reasonable expectation of success. So just because a certain scheme works for one
particular compound, doesn't mean that it will work for a million others.
So in the unpredictable art realm, it seems that over the years, the courts have
actually required that applicants come forward with a little bit more teaching. So maybe
enable a multitude of embodiments to cover the full scope of the claimed invention. And
fear -- and that was done because there was a fear that if the applicant discloses very
little, there is a danger that the full scope of the invention could not be practiced. So that
is the unpredictable realm.
On the flipside, we have the applied technologies, some electrical engineering,
mechanical engineering, and what are known as the predictable arguments. And they are
called predictable because usually in mechanical engineering, for example, you have
these well-defined predictable factors, so if you build an engine of a certain size, you can
predict how much power you would produce, for example.
So what is interesting about the predictable art realm is the courts adopted the view
that a single embodiment was often sufficient to enable a broad claim. So as long as you
provide a teaching for a single embodiment, oftentimes that was enough to enable a broad
genus. And, in fact, the courts would even uphold a broad claim even if it encompassed
other embodiments that were inactively disclosed.
So the assumption was that a skilled artisan in a predictable field could basically
extrapolate across the breadth of the claimed invention, so as long as I know how to make
and use one, I can extrapolate that over others. So that dichotomy between the
predictable and unpredictable arts actually created a problem in at least two ways.
The first problem was that it oversimplified the enablement, at least with respect to
the predictable arts. So as Judge Ridge said long ago, there are times when an
engineering invention, for example, has unpredictable factors, so having an unpredictable
dichotomy is not necessarily the best way to approach enablement. The best way to -- or
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one way to do it is to actually look at the unpredictable factors within a given art field as
opposed to just splitting the art units predictable/unpredictable.
The second problem with the dichotomy was that there was this assumption that, at
least in the predictable art fields, that the skilled artisans could always fill in the gaps that
the disclosure omitted. What you ended up with was a skilled artisan that had no identity,
so since this person could fill in all of gaps, it did not matter who this skilled artisan
actually was.
So as Professor Burke and those have pointed out long ago, at least in the
predictable art realm, it was basically easy to satisfy enablement, and enablement
basically played no role in limiting the scope of claims. So that is where we were, I
guess, until fairly recently.
So we come down to KSR, and KSR has been discussed a lot today, so I'm not
going to go into detail. I think that one lesson from the case was that the skilled artisan is
a person of ordinary creativity, so instead of being some imbecile or plotter for a
technology, this person is actually a creative individual. So I think it is fair to say that
after KSR, the Federal Circuit has started to give the skilled artisan more attention
explicitly within opinions, and we already talked about the Daiichi Sankyo case, which
we discussed in class. And it's fair to say that at least after KSR, you do see some
discussion of who this skilled artisan actually is.
In terms of enablement, I think that one thing that we have also seen since KSR is
the emergence of something that has been called full scope enablement. So as I
mentioned at the outset, for so long we always talk about obviousness as a lever to
modulate claim scope and patent rights, but here recently, we were also seeing that
enablement can be used to modulate patent rights, as well.
And so after KSR there have been three cases that basically have invalidated -well, three major cases that have invalidated patents for nonenablement. I am not going
to talk about all of them in detail, but I do want to touch on two briefly.
The first is the Liebel Florsheim case. In that case the invention was directed
towards a high pressure medical injection system, and in Liebel's application, the -Liebel explicitly recited an injector with a pressure jacket. So during prosecution, Liebel
actually learned that its competitor actually had a product that did not have a pressure
jacket on it, so what did Liebel decide to do? Liebel decided to actually modify its claim
so that its claims could actually encompass its competitor's products. So the way that
they did that, among other things, Liebel went through its patent application and actually
deleted all references to the pressure jacket and amended the claim so that the
competitor's injector would have come within the scope of Liebel's claims and that
worked.
In a subsequent infringement suit, the Federal Circuit actually affirmed the district
court's conclusion that Liebel's broad claim covered the competitor's injection. But the
problem was the following. In spite of that, the district court actually found that Liebel's
patent was not enabled, and there were at least two reasons.
The first was that -- so as I mentioned before, Liebel went through its own
application and deleted all references to pressure jackets. So although Liebel provided an
enabling disclosure for an injector with a pressure jacket, nowhere did the written
description describe a pressure jacket.
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So on appeal -- and really at trial and on appeal, Liebel actually argued, “Well, in
predictable art fields, as long as you have a single embodiment, that is enough to enable a
broad claim, so our single embodiment should be enough to enable both with the jacket
and without,” and the Judge Lourie said, “No, that is not the case.”
But also, more interestingly, Liebel's written description actually includes
statements which disparaged a jacketless injector. And I'm going to talk about
disparagement in a minute or so. For at least those two reasons, the Federal Circuit
actually affirmed the nonenablement.
The next case is Automotive Technologies versus BMW. In that case, the
invention related to automotive side impact sensors, so the Federal Circuit actually
adopted the district court's claim construction, that the broad claim covered both
mechanical and electronic side impact sensors. The Federal Circuit also affirmed
summary judgment of nonenablement because the written description only provided a
detailed disclosure for a mechanical sensor.
So, again, the argument at trial and on appeal was that as long as I provide a
detailed teaching for one, I'm entitled to the other because, again, it's a predictable art
field so you only need one embodiment. And, again, Judge Lourie actually rejected that
argument.
It seems there were two aspects of the invention that actually discouraged the panel.
One was the actual content of the written description. So with respect to the mechanical
side impact sensors, there were two columns and five figures devoted to teaching those.
With respect to the electronic sensors, there was one short paragraph and one figure, and
that one paragraph was basically a conceptual overview and not a specific and detailed
teaching. So there was sort of an imbalance within the written description.
The second problem was that side impact sensing was a new field, and that was
actually stated as such in the written description. And that signalled, at least to the Court,
that a skilled artisan would have a problem filling in the gap submitted from the
disclosure, so -- and also at the time of filing, there were no electronic sensors in
existence, so Judge Lourie actually concluded that the mechanical and electronic sensors
were distinctly different.
So the question is, so where does that leave us? And so those two cases and one
other, the Citrix versus Dreamworks, which I'm not going to discuss. These three cases
point to a few lessons for patentees. One is that if a claim covers a range of
embodiments, the disclosure should contain specific written descriptions that adequately
enable the scope of the range. And that is really nothing new because in the
unpredictable realm, that you could argue that that has been the case for a while. But,
again, in the predictable realm, there was this feeling that one embodiment was enough.
So patentees might actually consider instead of prosecuting one big patent
application with all of these different embodiments that are arguably distinct and
different, prosecuting smaller applications.
The second lesson is that a broadly construed claim coupled with a narrow
disclosure creates a high risk of invalidation. Keep in mind that enablement or
compliance with disclosure is as of the filing date. So if an applicant decides to broaden
the claim during prosecution, then the applicant better make sure that the disclosure
actually covers that new breadth basically.
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The third lesson is that if the -- if statements in the written description which
disparage an embodiment indicate that an embodiment is impractical or teach away from
an embodiment may suggest that undue experimentation is required. Such statements
tend to disavow claims or could be construed as disavowing claim scope and suggest that
that embodiment was nonenabled at the time of filing.
So the lesson here is that patentees should carefully choose language when drafting.
It is very tempting to say, “My invention is so much better than whatever” but, you know,
down the road, you will want to, I guess, obtain scope over that whatever. So you just
have to be very careful in how you actually word the written description.
So to conclude, I think, what do these cases do? I think one thing is that these
recent cases actually fuel a debate over the generic claim. So as all of us know, generic
claims can actually cover millions or billions of embodiments.
And the question is, after these cases, what is -- where do generic claims stand?
Obviously, generic claims is the fourth broadest scope of protection under the patent
laws. Some would argue that you need broad claims in order to encourage inventors to
actually enter the field and state the invention, promote disclosure.
On the other hand, you have a chilling effect issue, so while it certainly remains the
case that applicants need not provide a specific teaching for each and every embodiment,
I do think it is fair to say that the quantity of exemplification required after these cases is
actually higher now than it was before, so the end result might actually be a shift toward a
narrower claim.
So there needs to be a closer correspondence between what is disclosed and what is
actually claimed. So applicants may be less inclined to draft a claim that covers millions
of embodiments because it's almost impossible for the state to provide enough written
description to support a claim of that breadth.
DR. ZUHN: And, also, the Patent Office is trying to prevent us from doing that.
PROFESSOR SEYMORE: Yes.
DR. ZUHN: We are in limbo right now, and we will see what happens.
PROFESSOR SEYMORE: As a person who used to prosecute chemical patent
applications, the Markush claim was a staple of my life, so I drafted claims that covered
billions of embodiments, but the Patent Office -DR. ZUHN: You unsolved the problem.
MR. GROETKEN: If you look at what is really going on with the Supreme Court
and its current status and interaction with the Federal Circuit, you could say, “The
Supreme Court wanted to knock the Federal Circuit back a little bit, wanted to create a
situation of certainty, and even went so far as to put the term predictability in one case.”
So there was predictability or certainty for those who have to have the impact and the
outcome, i.e., patentees or owners.
The problem that we would look at, though, is that if you look at all of the cases
that are out there currently that have come down in the last, say, two to three years,
Merck, Illinois Tool Works, EBay, MedImmune, Microsoft, and KSR, only one really,
Illinois Tool Works, is dealing with the antitrust issue, which is kind of pro-patent. In
other words, there is not a per se market power in having a patent, as far as antitrust is
concerned.
But if you look at everything else, is it pro-patent? No, not at all. So really I would
argue to you that the pendulum, as this has been kind of couched for today, has swung
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back from the '80s and '90s where it was a situation of more pro-patent to a situation of
non-pro-patent today.
Well, what are we going to do about it? That is always the outcome part of this.
Well, I would argue to you that the outcome is not coming from the Federal Circuit and
probably not coming from the Supreme Court. Neither one wants to really -- the Federal
Circuit wanted to be the Supreme Court, got whacked back. The Supreme Court said,
“No, you are not the Supreme Court, and here are some changes to the standards.” Let's
just look at the cases.
With Merck, the 271(e)(1) situation with respect to utilization of drugs, in essence,
and preclinical and clinical trials, et cetera, anything related to the federal regulatory law,
like the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. Guess what, you can go ahead and use that
patented invention and the other side can't do that. Pro-patent? No. Change the
standard? Yes. It gave quite a breadth for the use of these things, for testing purposes,
experimentation, et cetera, as long as it related to something, say, for the submission to
the FDA or the BFDC. Okay. Fine.
Well, what is the outcome of that? Well, I would argue that the outcome again now
comes back to the patentees and the owners. What are you going to do about it? Well,
somebody is going to be able to maybe use my materials, but let's look at it from another
angle. Regulatory, from a biologics perspective, you still can't use my donor stem cell
bank, right? I'm not going to give that to you.
What else am I going to do? Well, yes, you might be able to use my compound,
but you can't use my methodology. You can't use my method, per se, in doing what I
need to get where I get. So you infringe in that particular situation. Do we get help from
the courts? No. We got the help from the patentees. They are looking at the statute,
working with their counsels and saying, “What is my outcome?” My outcome is, I have
to look at this in a new light. Does it create certainty? No. It created a situation where
counsels and patentees and owners work together to address, how am I going to address
this outcome now?
Then we look at the EBay case. Right? Here is a situation, Well, can I get a
permanent injunction, or is it the first-sale rule? In a situation from the Federal Circuit,
you infringe, permanent injunction will come forth. Now? No, now you have to meet
the four factor test. Pro-patent? No. What is the outcome? Well, today I will argue to
you that lots of patent plaintiffs anyway are considering, Well, I better argue irreparable
harm as much as possible, upfront and throughout my case. Why? Because I know this
factor, from the perspective of a lot of courts, at least in the district courts, when looking
at this in an equity situation, are going to say, “Okay, you are so irreparably harmed, I
can give you the permanent injunction.” But, also, don't forget that we still have the
ability for the preliminary injunction, we should utilize it to our advantage today.
So do we get certainty and predictability from the Supreme Court in the situation?
No. But we can create the outcome, based upon what we do in reaction to it. Again, it's
mostly an outcome basis for patentees and their counsel.
Then we look at MedImmune. This one for me is a major concern, but so as patent
counsels we went ahead and wrote a license and now even though they are paying the
royalties, guess what, I can go ahead and challenge you that I'm not infringing or your
patent is invalid. Really not a great outcome. And a lot of people said, “Well, what is
going to happen to me now? Are all of my licenses going to be troubling? Am I going to
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have problems?” Yeah, potentially, we think that is true, but we think there is a way to
deal with this as well. Did it create certainty again? No. The pendulum is swinging nonpro-patent, but we can address what we do at the time of renewal of old licenses and the
new ones we create today. How do we do that?
Well, first of all, you have a pre-suit notification clause. Right? If you go ahead
and want to challenge my patent, you have to challenge me four months ahead of time
and, guess what, you should also give me all of the prior art that you are going to try and
utilize, as well. Not so much of an advantages for a licensee now, is it? Because, guess
what, you gave me everything that you want to argue.
You could also argue that if you go ahead and challenge my patent for a declaratory
judgment action, I'm going to go ahead and say, “Fine, you are breaching, and you will
agree to that in the license that we have.” You could also have a situation of differing
royalty rates. If you challenge and I win, great, but the royalty rate goes up.
If I lose and I could still argue that you are taking no housing fees, et cetera, I will
have a reduced royalty rate but any way I am getting a royalty rate.
So those are some examples in relation of how is the impact and outcome. Did we
get certainty again? No. Because now you have these licensees that have the ability to
challenge. I understand that a patent like personal property has aspects for principles of
equity, like the Supreme Court said, but, unfortunately, it does not lead to uncertainty or
predictability for those of us dealing with it. Everyone in this room, as future patent
attorneys, counsels, inventor patentees, whatever it be, we still have to deal with the
outcome. I would say again, the pendulum is swinging to a non-pro-patent basis.
Finally, I will just touch upon KSR. Guess what, we are going to tell you now the
obvious standard is wider, a little more flexible. And we have even seen a response to
that, the Patent Office coming up with new guidelines. They are called examination
guidelines, and they have seven -- seven different tiers of this alone that examiners can
use and try and fit things into to say, “You are obvious” but yet they themselves, pursuant
to those guidelines, and with my interactions with the PTO and some of the
administrative staff are not really sure how to apply that.
Again, what is the outcome? Unpredictability. How am I going to do this? There
is two ways you are going to address it. As noted earlier on this panel, we are going to
address it with drafting. You are going to try and link your claims so you don't have an
elements analysis. You are going to address things in your background. You are not
going to point out problems. You just don't have time, and USPTO, pursuant to the rules,
you don't have to put in a background if you don't want to. It is not a requirement. I
encourage you to be careful with that type of analysis, but you don't have to if you don't
want to.
At the same time, you are going to be looking at how am I going to disclose things
better and focus on comparative examples and things of this nature, if available. And I
would argue that the change is in the various art. You have to look at it from that
perspective, as well.
Then let's turn to the rejections themselves. You have a rejection and now this
examiner is applying these standards. Well, first of all, did they? You still have teaching
away.
They say, I can take things from different arts, so there was a need and, therefore, it
was a predictable result. Is it? Maybe there is an unpredictable result. Maybe it was
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very difficult to manufacture that particular outcome that you have for your composition
in your claim. These things are all relevant points that need to be argued to the USPTO,
and I would say that the outcome of predictability again is coming from the patentees and
their counsels in addressing these issues, that we are now faced with the changing
standards or flexible standards from our various court systems.
So the pendulum may swing, but it swung before in maybe a pro-patent fashion.
And today it is swinging in a more non-pro-patent fashion, but in either situation, the
outcomes are the same.
The people that have to address it, the inventors and corporate entities that own
these IT assets are addressing it, and they need the assistance from everyone in this room
to figure out the best appropriate way, since things keep changing all of the time.
MR. SCRUGGS: Okay. We are about to open up for Q&A. I want to congratulate
our panelists on all doing a great on job.
(Applause.)
Okay. So now we will basically just open up the Q&A. If you have a general
question, go for it. If you something specific for one of the speakers, make sure you let
them know.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'll start. Footnote 11, from the MedImmune case, as I
recall, the court really did not address specifically the Federal Circuit's standard. They
just disparaged it in the footnote. Yet, the Federal Circuit has run with its tail between its
legs to a certain extent. It says that they are listening very carefully to the Supreme Court
and are very sensitive to what the Supreme Court has to say. Would you agree?
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I would say that is one signal that they are. I don't
have enough faith -- and I'm hopeful that they will.
Given their past history of never finding a Supreme Court case they could not write
themselves around, I'm not quite -- they are also afraid of the heightened level of review
that they are getting. If the Supreme Court stays away for a while, I think we see the
Federal Circuit start to assert its authority again.
You are absolutely right. Footnote 11 said reasonable apprehension of suit is
arguably inconsistent with our precedent but it was not present in the case before. Right?
That was not present.
So they did not answer the question, here comes SanDisk in the Federal Circuit,
like, Oh, it is gone. You could say that reasonable apprehension of suits is sufficient. It
may not be necessary, right, and that may have given us a little bit more guidance. Fine.
We can still use that to get a good feel for whether there is a declaratory judgment action
or not, but I think that was the Federal Circuit -- particularly, Judge Bryson's concurrence
sort of saying, If there is a dispute of any sort -- and taking it to its extreme, that can't be
the case. Right?
Article III cannot allow that type of dispute to actually go forward in every
circumstance. My hope is what you will see is the district court's clamp down on the
discretionary side. Right?
Even if there is an Article III case or controversy, they do have the discretion to not
hear the case, particularly if they think it is simply being used for negotiation leverage.
That is the other squeezing point. We blow this hole open, but we may tighten it up
down there through discretion. I'm waiting to see if that happens. I'm waiting to see how
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the Federal Circuit will react to district courts declining jurisdiction in that context. Will
they accept it? Will they actually get imbibed by discretion standards or not?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I bring it up particularly with regard to the Caraco case,
where there was actually a covenant not to sue. They said that was not enough either and
that was based on complex regulatory system. It just seemed to me that they went way
past anything that the Supreme Court would have directed them to do in accommodating
what they view as the Supreme Court's direction.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I agree.
MR. GROETKEN: If I recall the name of case, it was Clausen where I believe the
issue was inventorship, and they said even that would be enough, where you can go
ahead and say that is a controversy and we will go ahead and address that, as well. So no
one really knows, are you going this way or are you going this way with this kind of term
of licensees saying, I can challenge where. Where is "where" for Article III?
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: It is still a mess. Although, it does -- I know patent
owners are not thrilled with this, but in the pharmaceutical context there was this added
provision by Congress allowing a generic company who has applied to the FDA, there is
a complex regime, where basically you send notice to the patent owner that you are going
to get approval from the FDA. They have 45 days to respond. What happens if the
patent owner does not respond within the 45 days?
Congress did create this mechanism that said, “Well, you as the generic can go seek
a declaratory judgment action to get it clarified.” Pre-MedImmune, it was not clear that
that provision had any teeth under the reasonable apprehension of suit test. Now at least
it does have some teeth, so I know patent holders may not like it. At least if you are
looking institutionally, what did Congress attempt to create? At least that provision now
has a meaning, which it may not have had before.
DR. ZUHN: I just want to say two things.
One, the Caraco case is very having interesting, and just a plug for Kevin Noonan.
He wrote a summary. It's on the blog. He's a founding author on the blog, and it is a
very interesting case. And I highly recommend that you go read it because I think it is
very relevant in terms of this discussion.
And then I wanted to bring it back to obviousness. Maybe I'm just less skeptical
about the Federal Circuit with regards to obviousness. I'm going to give them the benefit
of the doubt on this one. There are cases out there, including one of the seven that I
talked about, where a district court did require an explicit teaching, suggestion or
motivation in a reference that was present, which is obviously as rigid an application as
you can possibly get, and they reversed on that.
But if you look at the Pfizer case, that is pre-KSR. DyStar is pre-KSR, and those
both have very strong -- they are very strong opinions, very strong statements about how
this is not a requirement.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I would say those are pre-KSR decisions. They are
post-KSR cert grants, maybe it's going to be KSR -- the decision didn't change anything.
I think that KSR did potentially change the law. It just was not the actual Supreme Court
decision.
DR. ZUHN: It was the anticipation of it.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: Exactly.
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The pro-patent pendulum, I do agree -- and I'm nervous that we are going too far to
being opposed to patents. Although, I think the Federal Circuit really gets a bum wrap on
this. I don't view them as pro-patent. If you are pro-patent, you should like the doctrine
of equivalence, and they hate the doctrine of equivalence, right? If you are pro-patent,
you should want broad generic claims. They don't like them. Right? Written
description.
Their concern really is the certainty thing, so they are really happy to have lots of
valid patents in lots of areas of subject matter that are that broad in scope. Right? They
like really narrow patents that are very valid, but you are not going to get much
protection with that patent, so it is sort of a mixed bag when it comes to whether the
Federal Circuit itself is pro-patent. I think they get a bad wrap in that regard.
I really think it is a mixed bag because what they are worried about is certainty.
They have this idea that uniformity and certainty is their mantra. That is why they exist.
That is what our mission is, and I think that can go a little overboard. So if there's a
reaction that the Federal Circuit takes from the Supreme Court in some regards, I feel that
is part of it, right? And it actually may help patentees in that regard.
DR. ZUHN: I wanted to throw one thing out about EBay. That is that MJ Roche.
Up until Roche appealed or filed notice of appeal, it has been an interesting case because
this shows you exactly what EBay is going to probably do, and I think we are going to
have the situation with almost every single therapeutic that you talk about, you know, the
competitor comes in and they might have a product that works a little bit better.
It falls within the claims of the patentee's patent, and that is the situation here. You
can't take that away -- you can't take this product away because it has a benefit, so you
have all four factors and you are done. The district court judge on that case made it
perfectly clear that the first two were boom, knock those factors right off. It is when you
get done with the last one that you have a problem.
MR. GROETKEN: I would agree, and a lot of generics, I think, are looking in that
direction. If I am going to come out with my generic formula or composition, one, I'm
bioequivalent, right, to get out there. And now I can actually show that it's cheaper and
it's going to be a situation where I have the benefit or a better benefit. It's a real concern
by big pharma to say, “Well, wait a minute, this case has an impact upon me because that
is exactly what is going to be argued.”
How am I going to get my injunction? How am I going to be able to stop this? I
would argue in response, “Yeah, you are going to have to use 271 in relation to those
time frames and a lot of the regulatory issues to your advantage right now in light of this
case.”
DR. ZUHN: Wait until we get bylaws, which I think is just a matter of time.
MR. GROETKEN: They are addressing it in Europe, so I think you are going to
see the U.S. dealing with biosimilars, in essence, soon.
MR. SCRUGGS: Any more questions? I thought I saw somebody here earlier?
DR. ZUHN: Nothing, Mike?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You answered everything.
MR. SCRUGGS: I actually have a little bit of a question. How much do you
attribute the recent Supreme Court interest -- I know Tim kind of mentioned The Perfect
Storm.
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How much do you attribute this to a dynamic that may be going on in the Supreme
Court with kind of a constructionist wing like the John Roberts and Alito faction kind of
combining with the Breyers and a couple of the other justices who just think patents got
out of control base case?
Kind of combining and aligning and deciding, “Okay, patents have gotten out of
control and we want this stuff grounded in the statute in Supreme Court precedent, not
necessarily the Federal Circuit?”
DR. ZUHN: I suppose that has something to do with it, yeah.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: And the change of personnel is important. Although,
the uptake of cases started happening before both of them came on, so I think that there
was momentum beforehand. Whether that momentum is carried over and is now based
on the concerns that you addressed, could very well be.
I really think what you had, cert grants take four and you have Stevens clearly
curious about what patent system -- he made it clear, he thinks something is wrong. You
have Breyer who has some exposure to it and some interest in it. I think -- the third
descentor Metabolite and then you throw Kennedy on board on occasion, right, his
concurrence on EBay.
So you have those four that clearly were curious. So to the extent that they wanted
to impact it, you had the block, you had the vote, so when I look at it from who seems to
be pulling the strings of when we are going to take stuff, I did not see it so much as the
Chief Justice or Alito being involved. Although, the Chief Justice, I think, is interested
obviously from KSR and he litigated some IP cases in practice. So I think it may have
been a tipping point for some of them.
DR. ZUHN: I think one thing that is interesting is last spring, California Health
Care Industry is a collective of California biotech and pharma companies. It came out
with this white paper, and their contention was that this is a three-pronged attack. Every
single branch of the federal government is out to get patentees, so you have the Patent
Office executive branch crafting all of these different rules packages, IDS rules, claims
and continuation rules, which were knocked down in GSK. The alternative claiming
rules, the appeal rules. I don't think that I missed anything.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: Subject matter guidelines, obviousness guidelines.
DR. ZUHN: Yeah. And new written description training materials that just came
out last week. So you have the executive branch doing that.
You have Congress patent reform. The House bill is -- I don't even know where to
begin. It's the one that is passed, and it got passed last September, I think. And it is
atrocious. There is aspects of it that patentees and patent practitioners -- if you read it, it
is going to make you sick. And the Senate bill is not that much better.
It's a little bit better because they have omitted some of the clauses, and we have
seen some clauses fall off recently like the date of treasury issue, senator sessions,
sticking some fork into the bill. So now he has agreed to pull that off the table. We will
see if anything gets voted there.
And then you have the judicial branch. So we have got -- then you have the
Supreme Court. And I think when you take that last spring, it looked really bad because
you had all three branches. For patentees and patent practitioners, it looks a lot better
right now because the Patent Office has been shot down, and GSK was an absolute
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victory as it stands right now, not having been appealed yet, for the patent bar and for
patentees.
And you are seeing the same thing with patent reform in Congress. It looks like it
is stalling and not going anywhere.
So the Supreme Court is really the -- and the Federal Circuit's reaction to that and
their fear of looking bad and, you know -- a piece about, you know, how long is the
Supreme Court going to continue to flog the Federal Circuit. When is this going to stop?
Really, that is the branch of government that we really need to work with.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: If you look at the FTC and NRC reports, too, the
things they flag as bad have all been corrected by the courts. Right? So even the impetus
for patent reform, at least by Congress, has been undermined.
DR. ZUHN: What I would like to see the Patent Office and Congress do and they
have not done, in my opinion, is listen to patentees and patent practitioners.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I don't think that is -MR. GROETKEN: I think he is somewhat right.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I disagree.
DR. ZUHN: I'm not saying about your particular stance, but I take issue with a
number of -- and I don't want to mention names -- academics who have led Congress and
the Patent Office down this road.
And, thankfully, right now we are at a point where hopefully it looks like we are
not going.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: My only counterpoint is -- I agree they should be
listening, but I think the Patent Office needs to remember that its ultimate customer is the
public, not the patent applicant. That is what I think it wants. They are there to represent
the interest of the United States public, not the interest of an applicant before the PTO.
DR. ZUHN: I think the problem with the PTO right now is that the rules packages
show clearly -- and I have spend countless hours researching -- and I'm sure you did, too.
MR. GROETKEN: Yeah.
DR. ZUHN: Last fall there are a lot of attorneys throughout the country that blew
lots of billable hours learning about the rules. They are very complex.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I agree with that.
DR. ZUHN: The problem is they were set up to address and benefit who? The
Patent Office administrators, so I think that is the problem.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I'm not saying that they are perfect.
DR. ZUHN: I agree they need to address the public interest, but I think if you
listen to -- patent practitioners are not up there saying everything is perfect.
MR. GROETKEN: At least giving us an opportunity to have a voice and say,
“That has some impact.” If you think about it, we really are the customers. And if your
customers are saying, “This is not working, this is not working the best way,” even if it
serves the public interest, at least try to work with that knowledge versus just ignore it.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I agree with that knowledge. I bristle at the thought
that you are the customers. I don't like that mentality for a public agency to think that
you have a customer. That is troubling.
That is like the EPA saying that our customers are the air pollution, the people that
pollute. No, it's not.
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DR. ZUHN: I agree with you to a point, but up until five years ago, funding that
went into the Patent Office which came from my clients actually got directed to the
public.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: Absolutely.
DR. ZUHN: It was Bedemer. So for five years we have not had that situation, and
the Patent Office is keeping the money that it is taking in as fees, and they are getting that
money not from the federal government, they are getting the money from our clients.
MR. GROETKEN: Which are customers.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: And you are getting your patent, right? You guys
get a patent and right to exclude. I'm not saying you should be shut out.
MR. GROETKEN: It's a poor exchange. I think it is even -- if we are going to
have that bargain, at least give us some ability to have some say and to work with the
Patent Office. I think right now they just said, “We don't want to hear from you at all.”
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: That is wrong. I'm not saying that you should not
have a voice.
I'm just saying that saying this works like a company where we have to worry about
our consumers takes a perspective that ignores the public's interest. It's a dangerous
metaphor to use, in my opinion.
DR. ZUHN: The Patent Office needs to stop worrying about the administration. It
needs to start worrying about -- I agree with you, the customer, the public interest, and its
own examining court.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: The examining court's problem is retention.
MR. GROETKEN: They have lost, what, 50 percent of those that they already
hired.
DR. ZUHN: They lose -- one of two examiners that walks in the door walks out
within three years.
MR. GROETKEN: Or less.
DR. ZUHN: Or less. That is a significant problem, and the real problem with the
Patent Office is production goals. So they are unreasonable, and the Patent Office refuses
to look at it. There is no difference in time for examining based on the number of pages
in an application, the number of claims in an application, the technologies. Let's face it,
technologies are not all created equal. Some are a little bit more complex.
MR. GROETKEN: Well, based upon the ability of that technology coming into the
Patent Office, I would argue there are certain technologies, nano, bio, et cetera, as they
become the technology and emerging, et cetera, they have had to -- higher, higher,
higher, and they can't because the industry, et cetera, is catching up here. Here is an
example of when that problem occurs, but yet they use a formulaic approach to the whole
situation of all units.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: There is a hand.
MR. SCRUGGS: I saw your hand come up a couple of times. I want to make sure
you get in there.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: He actually answered my question, so there goes that.
MR. SCRUGGS: Any other questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: With respect to that case of the side impact air bags and
enablement, wasn't that situation really a means-plus-function claim?
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PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: No. Anybody who has curiosity about disclosure,
Automotive is a very telling case in that if you think written description the doctrine is
wrong, as annunciated in LizardTech. If you like it, that is fine. If you think it is wrong,
Automotive is scary to you because it is the Federal Circuit making enablement exactly
like written description. Right?
That it hears a claim limit, this does not exist in the specification. They don't ask
whether one of in the art can actually understand that claim limitation. We simply say,
“It is not present in the disclosure, therefore not enabled.” So it is an expansion of
enablement and makes it much, much more akin to written description. It sort of takes
LizardTech Step 2, in my view.
MR. GROETKEN: Well, there it says that might be a situation of becoming more
like the Europeans, you know, show me line, show me page.
PROFESSOR: Yes, exactly.
DR. ZUHN: And it will lose the comment that the requirements are separate.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I'm one who thinks the distinction -- having two
different doctrines does not make sense, that it is one. Unfortunately, the answer I may
get from the court is, “You are right and it is written description, not the view of
enablement that I like.”
DR. ZUHN: I agree with you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: A case I saw recently in the area of reasonable royalties, I
think it is called Amato versus Microsoft. It dealt with pre-verdict damages versus postverdict damages, when an injunction is not entered.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I think it is the Z4, right? It's versus Microsoft. I
know which case you are talking about.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Something against Microsoft.
In that case the court made a comment that these pre-verdict damages have to -- in
terms of the hypothetical negotiation, would have to take into account the legal
uncertainty that surrounds negotiations prior to a resolution in court, which struck me as
contrary to the general rule that most people have been following in these hypothetical
negotiations. That if you are in that space, you are assuming that the patent is valid. That
is what the jury is told. Assuming that the patent is valid, what would the reasonable
royalty have been.
Does anybody have any thoughts about this particular -- it's a couple sentences in
this opinion that sort of suggests that a jury ought to be considering the potential
invalidity or the risk of invalidity in their determination, which would tend to result in
lower royalty rates being granted as damages.
MR. GROETKEN: I mean, the only thing I can say on this is, I don't like that
being included in the hypothetical. I don't see where it should be in the hypothetical. It
has nothing to do with the royalty analysis.
The other thing is, I think it is a situation of how do you determine what the legal
uncertainty is. If you say, what if I'm in a crowded bar or I'm not in a crowded bar. Is
that how you should do the analysis?
There is really no way to legitimately say and have a jury consider, how do you
know the legal uncertainty? It's not in its role. I think the sentences are just a very, very
poor choice of words.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: There are cases where you can actually see in discovery
that the parties, including the patentee had a discount internally?
MR. GROETKEN: Sure.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So you are not sort of asking the jury to determine a
discount based upon the evidence in the trial but rather to look at the evidence of their
own mental state when they were taking to each other?
MR. GROETKEN: Fair enough. But how are they going to look at the idea of
invalidity, et cetera? I just don't see that.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: Right. I mean, it is the ultimate hindsight problem.
You are supposed to do that with a hypothetical negotiation, step back in time, but now
you are really making it convoluted by, What would we think that validity is going to be,
now that we now that the patent is valid. Right?
You really seem to be having a problem in that regard, but there must be -- you see
that intuition in Justice Kennedy's concerns in EBay. Right? One reason he says we
should deny an injunction is if it's a patent that we think is the suspect validity, which to
me is a non sequitur. If we are at the injunction phase, it is not suspect validity. It is
valid. It seems to be that same kind of intuition going on.
Maybe theoretically it makes sense. If we really were back in time negotiating,
then one factor would be, well, what are my odds of winning? If I think that my odds of
winning are really 60 percent, proving invalidity, then I'm going to want a lower rate.
But to bring that in at the litigation phase, that just seems a nightmare. As if reasonable
royalty was not bad enough as it is. Although, you are right, Congress will make it
worse. That apportionment stuff disturbs me. But, yeah, that just seems a little bit
bizarre.
Now, if you want to take that thought into the ongoing prospective royalty rate,
there is no hindsight then. Right? It's a valid patent so that seems to be some unfortunate
language.
MR. SCRUGGS: Any more questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do we have time for one more?
MR. SCRUGGS: Oh, yeah.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: We talked about -- or Professor Holbrook mentioned how
the Federal Circuit kind of responds rather quickly to even minor suggestions by the
Supreme Court when they granted cert. It was quite obvious that they backed out the
motivation aspect rather significant and the statistics bear that out. I think that Professor
Davis at DePaul has a new study out that is going to show that rather significantly.
So it seems that overall the Federal Circuit may be taking a lesson in backing off,
making these pronouncements in general or trying to proceduralize certain aspects of the
law. But there is one area of the law that really needs some clarification, which is claim
construction.
And the most recent guidance that the Federal Circuit has put forth in Phillips, and
people would go back and forth saying they went -- they did not go far enough, they
should have gone further. In light of the Supreme Court, it's doubtful that they can go
any further than that.
Now, we talked about the fact that courts are -- or the Federal Circuit is leaning on
written description and maybe -- or blending it in written description, which may be their
only recourse in trying to clarify claim construction at this point.
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I'm just interested in what other ways you think that the Federal Circuit can clarify
claim construction or maybe written description is the best way at this point.
PROFESSOR HOLBROOK: I don't like written description as the lever because
then you have an invalid claim. I think most patentees would rather take a narrow claim
construction and keep a valid patent claim, as opposed to lose the claim under written
description, which that is some of the contention that is in LizardTech itself and Judge
Rader's descent. We have got this doctrine where we are giving in -- supposedly giving
expansive interpretation of these claims and then we knock them out as invalid under
written description. That does not seem appropriate.
So I don't like written description because of the external consequences. Right? I
would rather have some way to keep this within reasonable scope.
I think that Phillips is an utter disaster. It was the most disappointing opinion I
think I have ever seen. It gives the litany of the questions and it looks like it is going to
be everything that we ever wanted to know about claim construction but were afraid to
ask and answered none of it. In fact, if you read it right, seemingly it resolved the
question of dictionaries first versus specification first, seemingly.
But if you read Phillips, it expressly says, “We don't take into account any order of
evidence we will consider, you are still free to think of this.” I thought very tellingly, if
you look at the Federal Circuit's web page yesterday, they issued an errata. Now, most
times you don't look at erratas, right, but I'm like, What the heck.
They changed an opinion from last month where it said, “Phillips says that you
consider the evidence in this order and we will consider it in that order.” They delete that
language and say, “Phillips doesn't tell us anything about what order to consider the
evidence.” So if you want to do Texas Digital, you still can. Technically, it didn't
overturn Texas Digital. Phillips told us absolutely nothing, and some empirical work that
has been going on by Professor Wagner at Penn and Pentherbridge down at Loyola LA
says, in fact, everything is returned to the pre-Phillips state. If you believe there is a
dichotomy, holistic versus procedural approach, it is now back to how it was.
I'm trying to go through some claim construction cases now to give examples of,
well, when do they read limitations into the spec? I really can't find a justifiable basis
other than which judge is deciding the opinion.
So, ultimately, what do I think? I wish the Federal Circuit -- I was actually a
proponent of de novo review. I admit, I liked it. I thought it made sense. I thought it
was a really integral document, the courts should be able to do it.
I now have to back off. Why? Because I think the Federal Circuit failed in
providing strong legal rules to guide the courts. They are afraid for some reason to tell
the district courts, This is how it is done, do it this way, use these steps. Don't know why
they won't do it. And if they are not going to give that guidance, they need to give notice.
MR. SCRUGGS: Any more questions? Got a couple minutes. All right. Well, I
want to -- little round of applause again. Thank you all for coming.
(Applause.)
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